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# West Europe Report

(FOUO 37/82)



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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

PSF EXECUTIVE ON GOVERNMENT, PARTY PLANS, DELAYS

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 23 Apr 82 pp 74-76

[Interview by Florence Portes with Jean Poperen: "'Customs and Laws Must Progress on a Common Basis'"--Jean Poperen, the No 2 of the PS, Replies to the Question 'Has the Government Retreated in the Face of the Repeal of the "Security and Liberty" Law?']

[Text] While the government was delaying the repeal of the "nefarious" "Security and Liberty" law and was applying the brakes on regionalization, the chiefs of the Socialist Party, meeting in a seminar in Bougival, were taking counsel together. Jean Poperen, No 2 of the PS, explains how the Socialists must act after the cantonal-election defeat so as to regain an electoral majority and a popular base similar to that of the Gaullist party of recent years.

[Question] The government is coming up in the rear as regards the reforms. And people "aren't listening to" the PS, that gadfly of the government, anymore. Has the Socialist Party, as people say, taken sleeping pills?

[Answer] I have indeed read that accusation somewhere. In LIBERATION, and here and there elsewhere, in one form or another. It is the latest fashionable campaign. One day in Valence, we are accused of taking amphetamines; today, it is sleeping pills. I leave these judgments to the cognoscenti of artificial paradises. The truth is that we have never worked so hard, or with so much confidence. The French will have at least 7 years in which to realize this.

[Question] Nevertheless, in the recent cantonal elections, according to your own estimates, 5 to 6 percent of the Socialists--the hard core of your electorate--abstained. They were thus considering that the fruits did not live up to the promise of the flowers and that the government and you are sleeping.

[Answer] Even before the victory of the left, when we were reflecting on what the first 2 years would be like, we thought that they would be very tough. It is rather less tough than we had imagined. It is not surprising that at the most difficult moment of the effort, some of those who came to us last Spring are drifting off. This is not at all unforeseen. It is not tragic, but it does not, of course, leave us indifferent.

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[Question] And yet, after the last PS seminar, the question may be asked: are there still two factions in the PS, the maximalists and the minimalists? Or have the maximalists gone away?

[Answer] There are always some temperaments inclined to accelerate and others inclined to be more prudent. But the problems are not posed in terms of maximalism or minimalism. The debate does not lie there. After the series of discussions that we had last week, one thing is clear: there is no difference among us as regards the pace of the reforms. The important thing at present is to establish the order of priorities. And in this regard, considering all the tendencies together, we have come to agreement on the priority objectives: the success of the economic revival, and beating back the social injustices in a tangible way. And that policy holds good for all the Socialists, including those who have tasks in the government.

[Question] Do you mean to say that it is urgent to put some order into this all-around reform policy that makes the government's course resemble certain dances: one step forward, one step back?

[Answer] Do you mean to say that there has been some impression of disorder?

[Question] Not disorder--rather, incoherence of governmental action.

[Answer] We have indeed been aware of this reproach. That is why the Steering Committee, then the seminar of the PS secretariat, have stressed the necessity of real planning of governmental action and therefore also of the action of our party in the course of next year. This also implies real coordination between the principal party of the majority and the government. Certain of the "botches" that we blame ourselves for could have been avoided if relations had been closer and if the transmission of what we felt as being priorities had been faster.

[Question] What botches do you blame yourselves for?

[Answer] I am thinking mainly of the 39-hour affair, the price of gasoline and fuel oil, the Ralite decrees on internship, etc.

[Question] There are also other promises from the left that have ended up with a black eye from the problems posed by their application. The repeal of the "Security and Liberty" law, for example, in which the government retreated in the face of the realities.

[Answer] The government needed a delay. But here too, things are clear: that law will be removed. The Socialists have been given a mandate to broaden the spaces of liberty. They will not fail in this, but liberty does indeed need to be protected: for example, there is the necessity of retaining the identity controls.

[Question] Are you temporizing in a way?

[Answer] History has taught us that reform of customs necessarily takes time. People's attitudes should not lag behind the law; otherwise, the law will be poorly understood by the very persons who have to live by it: the citizens.

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[Question] What you are saying--would you have said it 10 months ago?

[Answer] By my background, I have always thought that customs and lifestyles and modes of thought evolved more slowly than the laws and political decisions. I was therefore a little surprised when I saw that the government was giving priority to initiatives taken in the realm of customs. But I said to myself that certain Socialist officials whose optimism was greater than mine were perhaps right.

[Question] Your analysis, today, is therefore this: that we do not have 10 months or 2 years in which to change the laws, but 7 years in which to change

[Answer] More precisely, it is necessary for customs and laws to progress on a common basis. The cart should not be put before the horse. Nor should change be braked. "Calm strength" is not just an advertising slogan. The expression corresponds to the determination of the Socialists, who have set themselves the long-term goal of both democratizing the nation and making the citizens responsible.

[Question] Nevertheless, is it so certain today that the French, so elected Mitterrand have chosen socialism? The results of the recent cantonal elections show a shift back to the right by those who voted for him out of anti-Giscardism.

[Answer] It would be an insult to those citizens who expressed themselves last Spring to say that they did so without knowing what they were doing. What we are in the process of setting up is indeed what we announced. Mitterrand was elected on 110 proposals that are only a part of the Socialist program, and the contract that binds us to the nation for the coming years concerns these 110 proposals. Not that that is not a considerable matter in itself. But I would agree with you when you tell me that there is misunderstanding as to method: "calm" means that one is counting on have time available. But we are not even halfway down the road. We are only just entering the period during which change is decided on, organized, written into the law, but is not yet felt in everyone's everyday life.

[Question] The time available--it is a matter of keeping to it. Between now and 1988, there is going to be an election per year. Isn't your problem to win back, while not deceiving your electorate, a part of the center which, in the cantonal elections, has got away from you?

[Answer] That is why I told you that in the coming years we must take a number of measures by which the people will feel concretely that on the everyday level, their life is changing. It is those measures that we are thinking about when we say that the social inequalities have to be beaten back. We will have an opportunity for them with the reform of taxation and the Social Security reform. We think that a more harmonious society will also be more effective economically. And to illustrate this more completely, I believe that the higher-level people in the enterprises, the ones with the medium and big salaries,

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will also derive advantage from a France in which the social injustices and the antagonisms are attenuated--a France that is less tense, more fraternal.

[Question] The fact remains nonetheless that some concessions to the center, if not to the right, are necessary. Mitterrand is in a situation of imbalance with a party on his left (the PCF, part of whose electorate is dropping it) and nothing on his right.

[Answer] One should distrust false symmetries. In the heyday of Gaullism, there was one distinctly predominant popular party and another, less important formation, the Independent Republicans, whose presence, though, was necessary to the existence of that majority. We, from the point of view of the left, are entering into a quite comparable period. But this implies that the PS should consolidate its own popular foundations.

[Question] You mean that the PS's base should be broadened. In what direction?

[Answer] The answer is not political in the narrow sense of the term. Indeed, we think that some important social forces interested in change--in the first place, the wage-earning masses--have not yet been won over to the Socialist Party, and that they can and should be. In the same way that Gaullism would not have been a majority formation without winning over some forces that traditionally were not of the right, the left will not be a solidly majority formation if the Socialist Party does not win over some forces who up to now have not been on the left.

[Question] Is that why you speak of "social compromise"?

[Answer] No--social compromise is an entirely different thing. Insofar as our program, as important as it is, does not presume to change everything in this country, this means that we intend to establish a compromise with the forces that up to now have been socially dominant--that is, they have held the economic power. And naturally, this compromise will create a situation more favorable to the world of labor.

[Question] Compromise implies concessions.

[Answer] Naturally; on both sides. Our concession will be not to carry out the whole of the socialist program right off. But on the other side, our interlocutors must be persuaded that we are not going to fall back to the rear.

[Question] Does the PS have the strength to make such a policy prevail?

[Answer] I think it does. In any case, one should work to have it, together with the other formations of the left (the PCF and the other organizations of the union of the left).

[Question] Yes; but the cantonal elections have shown that a new relationship of forces has been established within the union of the left.

[Answer] That is why I say that today, the future of French-style socialism depends essentially on the Socialist Party, on its capacity to do things, to persuade in order to win over. And believe me, in this regard, even if our discussion in recent days appears less impassioned, that does not mean that on our part there is any pause on the ideological level.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

VARIED CGT, CFDT, FO POLICIES, ALLIANCES REVIEWED

Paris PROJET in French May 82 pp 653-639

[Article by Francois Emile]

[Text] "I don't love you, too!" The celebrated sally, in a way, sums up the relationships that have prevailed between the left's labor and political wings since 10 May. One might almost say that the heady brew of victory touched off a sort of honeymoon, interrupted from time to time by serious misunderstandings which were not such as to lead to a breakup in the marriage (of convenience?). One cannot say as much of relations among the labor organizations: rivalries and schisms seem to run deeper than ever, and there is no indication of the hoped-for birth in the next few months of the broad labor front in support of government policy which the government (discreetly) and the Socialist Party (openly) have been pleading for.

The CGT and the Changeover

After months on the offensive against the socialists in general and M Mitterrand in particular, in which the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) was by no means laggard, despite stormy internal criticism, the communists finally got "their" ministers into the cabinet. That move lent itself to interpretation as a tactical ploy to keep the peace on the labor front and to implement the heralded reforms, thanks to the support or at least the benevolent neutrality of the giant organization. There was even reason to believe that the CGT would be put under some degree of gag rule in case of major disagreement over policy. For its part, even though the nation's choice at the polls was not the one it wanted, even if the PC's falling-off in the elections affected it directly, the CGT could count on the government's taking its goals into serious account -- particularly in that its "political philosophy" relies largely on the government to "impose the change," willy-nilly, on the class enemy: the employers.

Though the objective of labor peace has at last been largely reached, relations between the socialist government and the CGT are not, even so, all sunshine and roses. The differences have to do in large part with conflicts and troubles inside the CGT itself. First of all, the tack taken by the CGT prior to May 1981, damned as sectarian both by

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outsiders and by its own dissidents, has yet to be visibly altered. Even as its leaders claim to be hewing to the line of the landmark congress of Grenoble (1978), indications of a totally different trend have been piling up since early 1981. In September of that year, it was officially announced that M Krasucki, who rejoices in his reputation as a hard-liner, would succeed M Séguy, who was tired; the hard line turned even steelier toward the "dissidents" in the executive office and the national office, who were members of the PCF or the Socialist Party; the PSF actually had reason to fear that the effect of retirements and replacements would totally eliminate them from a structure they had joined in 1972. And events in Poland revealed how stubbornly some of the rank and file, as well as some important union cadres, balked or flatly refused to accept the leadership's analyses of the countries in the East -- seeing that leadership once again slavishly following the PC. Despite its disclaimers, the CGT was perceived as more or less supportive of eastern-style socialism, which was precisely the thing the socialists wanted to keep their distance from. As often happens in these cases, the hot-and-heavy media campaign against the CGT and the PCF led the latter to even more emphatic reassertion of its "class" positions and, logically, to point out how all-out support for Solidarity played into the hands of the right.

On the union action ground, the CGT is running into difficulties, some of which are not altogether unrelated to those just cited. On the one hand, the CGT claims it is the entering wedge for change: there, as in the PC, that word has become a shibboleth. And so it has struck out along a difficult path, dodging from oneupmanship -- both to force the socialist government to go further and to stay alive as a proposal-making force -- to unalloyed support -- which may well make it look soft by comparison with a feisty and combative rank and file. We have seen examples of both: the CGT was euchred into denouncing CDFT-led strikes against the railroad or in hospitals -- where communist cabinet ministers are in power -- and to give its blessing to settlements its rank and file had rejected -- as in the case of the city of Lille. On the other side of the coin, the CGT has been adamant on the question of shorter work-weeks -- with no cutback in wages -- by appealing to the government rather than entering into direct negotiations at the company level or at the industry level. Generally speaking, one might feel that the CGT's demands were reasonable at the practical level; theoretically, though, it has been charged with behaving more than ever like the hard-line mouthpiece for the PC, whose men in the cabinet oblige it to practice prudence. To back up this allegation there are repeated charges from the right, and even more from Force Ouvrière (FO) to the effect that the CGT is out to take over the state-owned corporations through infiltration of their shop councils. Most cogent, though, are M Krasucki's public remarks, which seemed to hint at an increasingly hard line in the CGT if the government strayed too far from the goals or views held by the CGT's central bureau (as happened at the time of the coup d'etat in Poland).

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## The CFDT: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

We used to think that the CFDT, many of whose members were and are also Socialist Party members, and many of whose members are now in staff positions to cabinet members, would live in natural -- if not over-close -- symbiosis with the socialist government: that has not been the case at all. The main office on the Rue Cadet has several times taken its distance, in no uncertain terms, from the government. The "mouthing-off fits" to which M Maire is prone have indeed become a CFDT specialty, culminating with his outrage at Mr Mitterrand's "mistake" on the issue of the 39th hour: when the head of state declared that no wage-earner should see his purchasing power curtailed because of that one hour less, M Maire accused him of betraying the priority of jobs -- citing the sacrifices it must entail. The negotiations by branches of industry, the CFDT's favorite bargaining approach and well under way in several sectors, were thereby cut adrift and emptied of meaning, never mind the fact that the negotiations centered on the specific issue of lower wages in exchange for creating new jobs.

Commentators regularly make much of the affinities between Messers Maire and Rocard to explain the differences between the CFDT and the socialist government. This is perhaps true, provided the alliance or opposition is not confined to issues or individuals, but centers on basic issues. It is obvious that the government has not made its choice -- and cannot make one -- between the CGT and the CFDT, and that it has given grounds for satisfaction and disappointment to both organizations. On the nuclear question, on the minimum wage, on the 39th hour -- it did not go along with the CFDT. Bound to the socialists in any case by countless objective and subjective ties, the CFDT has tried to mark its boundaries or rather to define specifically the confines of responsibility: let the government govern and lay down the broad guidelines for a labor policy, and leave the unions to do the negotiating in the plants and in the various sectors of industry. More than ever, the CFDT rejects changes in labor relations imposed from on high, anything that even looks like state-ism, any policy that ignores the protagonists in the labor-management drama. It rejects automatic reliance on the state to arbitrate in disputes, and it believes increasingly in a return to the old union ways, giving top priority to thrashing out issues on the spot. To hear its leaders talk, at least, the CFDT also seems ready for sharing the jobs, or for a kind of solidarity that would imperil some gains already made.

That road is a challenging one at a time when de-unionization, despite some signs of recovery, is still a worry. Even more clearly, though, we see how neatly it falls in with the views or afterthoughts of the voters, by not immediately withdrawing from the labor battle, by turning down the mouth-watering prospects of a program to implement, by making a clearcut distinction between union action and political action (the CFDT sternly bars its political section from the shop, which may be a hindrance to union activity and welcome primarily to the PC and the RPR). In the end, the CFDT winds up in a position the inverse of the CGT's: its theoretical differences with the government are real,

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but not fundamental; in everyday practice, though, the way of bringing change to pass leads to some major slippages, most notable of which is the fact that in case of labor strife, the government could hardly count on the CFDT to defuse it.

On the basic issues, the government has some arguments to get across: in addition to the attrition in union ranks already cited, it can cite the complications of bringing about labor change in small companies, where the union side is often non-existent physically if not morally, and the weakness of unionism in France, both in numbers and by reason of its divisions. More generally, the CFDT's position on the fringes of "policy" is not quite so clear as it claims, any more than are its claims as to the clout of organized labor. Finally, it is by no means certain that its rank and file goes along with the leadership all the way, especially on the more qualitative issues (such as the idea of "spreading the jobs around" for one).

It is nevertheless likely that the real quarrel between the CFDT and the socialists stems from the different perceptions of the nature of socialism. The "Polish business" has brought out that disparity. It was there first of all in reaction time to the coup d'etat: we all remember how the socialists hemmed and hawed, while the CFDT came out immediately in the vanguard in blistering denunciation of the coup d'etat. The discrepancy appeared again over what position to take vis-à-vis the Soviets and their satellites: the CFDT condemned the Soviet gas pipeline agreement, and more generally it called for some hard thinking as to the real means available for bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union. And then there was the rift over their total theoretical divergence as between the Soviet model of socialism and citizen-managed socialism, socialism with a human face, the socialism of freedom, or whatever you want to call it: M Maire put his finger right on that fundamental dichotomy between the CFDT and the CGT at a press conference on 24 February 1982, when he said: "There is nothing in common between the CFDT and CGT concepts of the pattern for society." For its part, the PS confined itself to questions posed to M Marchais and the government goes right on as it did before with its communist ministers -- who did, however, manage to find some more cogent terms than the Party did to castigate the coup d'etat.

#### The FO as Counterweight

On the Polish business, Force Ouvrière (FO) was only half a step behind the CFDT: once again, its views on communism were proved right. But most of all FO found itself with an unexpected chance to win back a touch of initiative vis-à-vis the new government. Everybody remembers the beaming smile on M Bergeron's face as he walked down the steps at the Elysée after his interview with the President: we hadn't seen its like since... the days of M Giscard d'Estaing. We knew that M Bergeron was a member of the Socialist Party and M Mitterrand's friend, but we were by no means unaware of the FO's good relations with the late government and, in some sectors, its conciliatory attitude towards the employers. Relations between FO and the government, with the left in office, looked unpromising, at best. As it turns out, FO has become

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Without opposition from the left, this labor organization was no longer capital's pet partner in negotiations; vis-à-vis the CGT and the CFDT, it even had reason to fear that it would have very little clout in the "change," an issue upon which it had never spoken out clearly. As the last bitter drop in its cup of woes, M Mitterrand announced his choice to head FO's longtime fiefdom -- the civil service: a communist minister! Two more cabinet seats -- transport and public health, where FO had sunk deep roots -- also went to communists!

In view of all this, we see why FO has taken a prudent -- not to say defensive -- stance: the prime objective was to stay alive in government eyes, squaring off against the other two national labor organizations. FO has kept up a steady drumfire of warnings against a possible CGT takeover of the civil service, with the complicity of its minister. Another perceived and publicized peril is that of stepped-up CGT infiltration in industry, using the shop councils to that end: M Bergeron's national staff already sees them as "potential soviets" (and that fear is shared for other reasons by the CFDT and others, all of whom warn against the dubious quality of socialist candor on this point). The Lucet scandal crystallized this radical opposition and, in the FO's view, demonstrated the CGT's hidden power in its capacity "to make and unmake appointments from now on." Looking at the other side of the coin, we must in all honesty point out the dazzling amount of light this affair shed on some FO-based alliances with the political right.

As G. Adam predicted in this same space (PROJET, no 159, p 1055), the new turn matters have taken in no way favors any fence-mending with the CFDT. FO was not slow to complain about the presence of dangerous CFDT "dreamers" on ministerial staffs. Quite apart from such minor flesh-wounds, though, the differences between these two national labor organizations run too deep to permit them to overcome long-standing mistrust at every level: turf claims staked out, connections, concept of the labor struggle, ideology... The FO's ideology has traditionally been not to have one at all, and to stand resolutely against any politicalization, fiercely to defend the trade or craft interests of those it represents in dispute or dialogue with the government and with the employers, without any preconceived notion as to the form or face of the society waiting to be built. There is a certain pleasing consistency in all this, what L. Jospin calls a "stability factor," and FO quite probably does touch a deep chord of response in present-day France -- witness its apparently rising membership. Militating against this, though, is an apparent immobility in union thinking and action: the concepts of solidarity and of job-sharing, aired in some government quarters and in the CFDT, find little echo here -- let alone any responsive mobilization. In the battle over the 39-hour workweek, FO sided with the CGT in demanding total compensation for the unworked hour and, as of now, M Bergeron has sworn to repeat the whole operation should the workweek be further curtailed to 35 hours.

In short, the schisms that divide organized labor's ranks have not shown any signs of healing since 10 May. Could it have been otherwise? In a situation where the socialist government is tempted to perceive a

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conventional balance of power, the labor unions are faced with the need to defend both the positions they have fought for and the positions from which they started, to win new power bases, and to expand their influence: a dominant position in a shop council (CE), control of a credit union, a swing vote on a joint commission -- all of these confer substantial advantages which no sensible man would sacrifice for a government which will not, when all is said and done, last forever....

While it is quite understandable that the government and the Socialist Party deplore these rifts, which constitute a clear net loss of potential gain insofar as support for and promotion of their policies is concerned, the lay-preacher role the government would like to see the unions playing raises a problem in and of itself: how would you handle the inevitable conflicts that would arise between national and labor policy? Wouldn't the unions be drawn very shortly into political adventures where they stand to lose everything, beginning with their independence? Isn't there always the risk of creating a kind of collusion between the hard-liners, political and labor, who are in the minority but whose voices are loud indeed, arrayed against the political opposition and above all against the vast silent majority, which already feels that the government and labor are already too cozy by half?

Practically speaking, for all the reasons cited here, the unions do not seem called upon to play so much a relief role as one of "critical support," an expression in which the two words carry very different connotations in the several organizations. The CGT, as a result of its traditions, its alliances, and its current mindset, is a troublesome -- and fragile -- ally for the Socialist Party; the CFDT, close to the PS, at the same time performs a critical function of its own which the politicians would happily do without. FO, for the moment, has opted to wait and see, but it is likely that its rank and file, to a greater extent than those of the other organizations, will not invariably share the economic and political objectives of the present government. More than ever, for that matter, organized labor's rank and file is unpredictable: in the many labor disputes that have marked recent months (33 percent more strike days in January 1982 than in January 1981!), some alliances have been struck that reflect nothing but battlefield tactics: CFDT + FO + CGC versus CGT and CFDT over the metalworkers, FEN + FO + CGC + CFTC versus CGT + CFDT in the civil service, etc. The way the government is talking may well be heard only by the already converted militants, and thus be addressed primarily to them. And the louder the talk about a "break" grows, the less welcome it will be to any broader reach of opinion. Considering the narrowness of the PS's electoral support, one must perforce conclude that the "explanation of the change" [read: understandable and favorable presentation] so ardently called for in so many official speeches, may be a long-term undertaking. M Delors has resorted to threats: "If the unions want to see the right back in power, they have only to keep on as they are doing" (LE PELERIN, 15-22 April 1982). The Socialists will have no choice but to count on all their tame professors.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

RELATIONSHIPS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM EXAMINED

Paris POUVOIRS in French No 21, 1982

[Article by Michel Tatu: "Institutions in the International Communist Movement"]

[Text] "The phase of socialism that begins with the October Revolution has exhausted its driving force" (resolution of the leadership of the Italian Communist Party, 29 December 1981).

"The organization of the revolutionary workers movement around the USSR is dead forever" (Santiago Carrillo, secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party, 11 January 1982, in Madrid).

In view of these statements by the champions of "Eurocommunism," one might believe that everything has changed in the communist movement, that something different will have to be found to try to rebuild a budding international structure, unless it is purely and simply given up. Seen from Rome or Madrid, this is true: Eurocommunism is not as dead as is sometimes claimed. On the contrary, it is being called upon to develop as crises are foreseen in the "camp" of "real socialism" and as the image of that camp abroad deteriorates. But it will be something other than communism, probably a kind of "Euroleft" reconciled with the social democrats, a new deviation rejected by the Soviet party, even if with less of a row than was once the case, and cast into darkness.

Seen from Moscow, in fact, things have not changed; on the contrary, one observes a remarkable constancy. Even the evolutions that seem new to us, such as the emphasis placed on the role of the Red Army in the expansion of "socialism," were already present -- and expressed even more blatantly than they are today -- in the heyday of the "driving phase" of which Berlinguer spoke. "The people's democracy," said Bierut, head of the Polish Communist Party in 1949, "is not the result of an armed uprising.... It did not emerge like the power of the Soviets in October 1917 in Russia. It is the fruit of the victory of the Soviet Union over the armed forces of German fascism." The organ of the Cominform, "For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy," was just as clear when it wrote, on 15 December 1948: "The presence of the Red Army in Europe was the guarantee of the free development of democratic forces in the liberated countries."<sup>1</sup>

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The constant factor is in fact the primacy of force in relations between parties, with force conceived as an instrument (not necessarily the only one) for achieving the ideal result, which changes even less than all the rest: an essentially bilateral relationship between the "father party" and the "son party," as the Chinese said in the 1960's, agreement on all major questions, but mainly on what Moscow deems to be its main interests in foreign policy and even more, on the image of the USSR itself, of which there must be no criticism.

If this result can be obtained through ideological attraction alone, so much the better. But that is rarely adequate, especially since the maximum support, even adulation, is demanded. The great Soviet party not only wants to be supported, but loved, in the way of the incantations that it addresses to itself daily in PRAVDA. Between sincere support, but a support freely discussed and consequently, contingent and revocable, and fawning, the Soviet leadership since Stalin has always chosen the latter. Now then, the latter is assured all the more solidly when it is based on relations of dependency, when it is maintained by pressure, whether financial, police or military, and when the "friend" turns into an "agent."

That is why relations of partnership, equality and free discussion have never actually been possible in the communist world, even with a party as powerful as the Chinese party, which learned the consequences in the 1960's. That is also why the "touchstone of proletarian internationalism," as was recently stated and is still thought today, could only be loyalty to the Soviet Union, approval of the Kremlin's decisions even when the most difficult one (from the German-Soviet pact of 1939 to the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979) were not the subject of consultations between "friends." The equation "anti-Sovietism = anticommunism = fascism" is just as valid today, in the real thoughts of the Soviet leaders, as it was in the 1930's.

These multilateral forms given to the movement have always been secondary compared with this fundamental link of each party with Moscow. In the 1930's, the Komintern was no more than a chamber that gave its stamp of approval to Stalin's decisions, like all other Soviet institutions. The great communist conferences of the 1960's were interesting, for the Soviets, only insofar as they produced the greatest possible alignment of brother parties on the positions, already drawn up in advance, of Moscow.

This constant concern of the Kremlin has always transcended the disagreements or rivalries between leaders. All accounts subsequently gathered have always confirmed that the "line" did not truly change -- at least with regard to intentions -- from Molotov to Khrushchev, Brezhnev to Suslov: It was always a question of gaining the most for "us," vs for "them," the foreigners.

Having said this much, the approach is not the same depending on whether it is a question of the progress of the empire, the nearby area or the periphery and therefore, the communist movement in the broader sense. As General Gallois emphasizes, the USSR does not back up when it has a foothold in a neighboring country with its own army (as in Afghanistan). It may be more flexible, on the other hand, when it is a matter of defending its "interests" in Africa or Asia, even a rather costly investment in a remote region. What is true of



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the military strategy is also true of the general attitude. Even Fidel Castro, who is "building socialism" in Cuba and whose fall would therefore constitute a very painful setback for the "wheel of history," does not represent such a vital investment for the Soviet leadership as Poland or even Bulgaria. On the other hand, he can allow himself some freedoms that would be poorly tolerated elsewhere. Based on geographical distance, two major spheres must be distinguished:

1) the nearby sphere: It does not totally follow the lines of what is now called the "socialist community" (the term replaces that of "socialist camp," with its distasteful connotations) and which, according to the official enumeration given at the Congress of the CPSU in February 1981, includes ten countries in addition to the USSR: Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia in Europe, and Vietnam, Mongolia, Cuba and Laos, for the remainder.<sup>2</sup> The Europeans enjoy privileged treatment, if it can be called that: They will be defended at all costs, even at the price of atomic war, if the West intervenes, and in any case, at the price of direct "fraternal" interventions against internal subversion, as the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, to a certain extent, Poland have seen.

Here again, the bilateral tie is more important than membership in the multilateral institutions set up since the war. Both the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA, or COMECON for Westerners) and the Warsaw Pact were formed much more for the purpose of responding, on the propaganda level, to Western evolutions than for that of meeting real needs: CEMA, set up in 1949, was supposed to checkmate the organization of West Europe under the Marshall Plan and in 1955, the Warsaw Pact was aimed at responding to the consolidation of the Atlantic Alliance and the recent entry into it by West Germany for the sake of rearming.

The Kremlin had previously viewed attempts at multilateral organization of the new "Eastern bloc" with reticence, fearing that the "people's democracies" might develop a suspicious solidarity with respect to Soviet tutelage. (Right after the war, Stalin had rejected the idea of Balkan federation proposed by Dimitrov.) Moreover, these organizations contributed nothing that had not already been obtained much more satisfactorily by bilateral arrangements and treaties.

That is why CEMA and the Warsaw Pact remained ghost organizations for many years. Even today, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact would not put an end to the different bonds established over the years between the USSR and each of its satellites according to treaties of friendship and mutual assistance concluded in the 1940's: The presence of the Red Army in all those countries (except in Romania and, only in principle, in Bulgaria) and also that of Soviet advisers at different levels in the ministries of defense and interior in each country are the surest guarantee of keeping their governments orthodox.

The fact that very few elements are known about the organization and operation of the machinery of the Warsaw Pact is rather a sign of their effacement rather than of their power. More is known about the organization of the Soviet Armed Forces. It would appear that the level of integration of the forces is

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not as great as in NATO, but this has little importance, to the extent that the governments involved have no other choice, in case of war, than to put all their forces at the disposal of the Soviet command. Furthermore, their equipment and munitions, nearly all of Soviet origin, are much more standardized and uniform than in the West.

As for CEMA, it has gained in influence since the end of the 1960's because of a double evolution: The Soviet leaders, beginning with Khrushchev, have viewed it as a means of further integrating the economies of their allies and of adjusting them to their own designs after the liquidation of the excessively Leonine ties of yore (particularly of the joint companies set up after the war) gave more autonomy to the planning of each country and encouraged a certain "nationalism of heavy industry." Second, the growing complexity of economic problems and the solidarity that naturally emerged between economies performing too poorly to face international markets on a large scale, could only tighten the bonds between all nations in the system.

The fact remains that CEMA is much more an organization of "coordination," a place for an exchange of views and information, than it is an autonomous institution with its own power. Not only does it not have even limited powers of the European Commission, but it can in no way be compared with a "common market," first of all, because there is no "market" in the economies of "real socialism" and second, because there is no currency that is freely transferable, even within the bloc.

Nevertheless, the organization of the countries of East Europe remains an important problem that will have to be taken up one day, even and especially after the Soviet tutelage over those countries is relaxed. Conditions would already be ripe for the establishment of a community of countries of Central Europe, countries with over 100 million inhabitants, too weak to expose a production apparatus modeled by 35 years of "socialism" to Western competition and at the same time, the bearers of specific interests vis-a-vis the USSR, whose needs are complementary, but which must always be kept at a distance because of its hegemonic tendencies. While remaining more highly developed than the Russian "big brother" in many fields by virtue of their own historical traditions and their level of education (this is the whole paradox of Soviet colonization, which takes after peoples more advanced than it is itself), the satellites have already ceased being a zone of exploitation and have become a burden. Under penalty of having to face crises, Russia must meet their needs for energy and often, despite its own difficulties, for food products.

2) the distant sphere: Here things are much more flexible, on the one hand, because Soviet interests are not as obvious or vital and on the other hand, because nothing is set and tactics must be adapted to the circumstances. Nevertheless, the strategy is the same, serving the same goal: recruiting and conserving the most friends possible and try to have them remain as loyal as possible.

However, one must admit that the "ideological" dimension of these friendships has suffered the same ideological erosion that has been noted in the USSR itself. The "communist" and "workers" parties are no longer and will never again

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be the big "family" they once were, as shown by the constant deterioration in multilateral ties and the forms they have taken over the years.

Already, in vocabulary if not yet in fact, the Cominform, the organ of information between parties set up in 1947, presented itself as a watered down version of the Comintern, the real center of coordination which the avant-garde Communist International had intended to be and which Stalin had dissolved in order to please his Anglo-Saxon allies in 1943. After the liquidation of the Cominform in 1956, the main common institution became the World Conference of Communist and Workers Parties, which met in Moscow in 1957 and 1960. However, the enterprise was already off to a shaky start due to the aggressiveness of Mao who, not content to have broken up the "socialist camp," now attacked the movement as a whole.

The Soviets, who as early as 1963 failed to obtain a condemnation of China, succeeded in holding another conference of that type in Moscow in 1969, but the result was very disappointing compared with the sum of efforts made. What was worse, such attempts worsened conflicts instead of helping to settle them. Consequently, a more geographically limited formula was chosen: the pan-European conferences, the first of which was held in Karlovy-Vary (Czechoslovakia) in 1967 and the second in East Berlin in 1976.

Another attempt, this time by the French and Polish parties in April 1980 in Paris, again worsened difficulties by exposing the considerable number of absentees: the Italian, Spanish, British, Romanian and Yugoslav parties, to name only the main ones. In addition, these conferences, whose level of representation is small (first secretaries in 1967 and 1976; less important leaders in 1980), are less and less "communist" and more and more concentrated on themes appealing to a broader audience, such as peace and disarmament. Will the communist movement end up as an appendage of the Warsaw Pact?

Today, at any rate, especially after the "Italian schism" which, although it did not take the now impossible form of a Yugoslav- or Albanian-type excommunication, nevertheless signifies an aggravation of the conflict between Moscow and the largest party not in power, the Soviet leaders face a choice: either act as if they did not notice their growing disagreements with a series of parties and try to rally them to a vague platform of support for their diplomacy, as they did almost throughout the 1970's, or fall back on the "hard core" of their truly loyal followers, reinforcing the pro-Soviet feelings of small peripheral parties (Portuguese, Latin American, and so on) and, regarding the others, create splits wherever the anti-Soviet wave has become far too aggressive.

Although it is still too early to say to what extent this tactic will be applied to the Italian Communist Party, it is clear that the Kremlin will lean and is already leaning toward the second choice.

Its own traditions point in that direction, but there is a triple observation: In West Europe in particular, the anti-Soviet deviation comes up against part of the traditional communist clientele marked by memories of the antifascist struggle and the exultation of the "fatherland of socialism." It poses a problem of identity for leaders who fear having to choose between the old communist

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family and the hated social democrats. Finally, the spectacle of the growing military might of the USSR and the use it makes of that might in coming to the aid of dependents either in an extreme minority or in difficulty, as in the case of Afghanistan, Angola and Ethiopia, are enough to make communist leaders in the world think a bit: "What if, instead of selling our souls to win elusive voters, we were to double our loyalty to Moscow in order to benefit, when the time comes, from the 'change in the ratio of forces' imposed by the USSR on the international level? Would 'panzer communism' not be, after all, a better springboard to power than a debilitating Eurocommunism?"

From the wait-and-see attitude of the Toudeh in Iran to the zeal of a Cunhal in Portugal, it is clear that this calculation explains the attitude of many parties. Nor could it be foreign to the unnatural evolution of a party such as the French party, which supported the invasion of Afghanistan and the crackdown in Poland, while it criticized the intervention in Czechoslovakia. At least, one cannot otherwise explain such a change, a change that is all the more paradoxical because it coincides with the decline in the image of the USSR in the opinion of the country to be convinced. That was the judgment of Jean Poperen, whose statement caused Charles Fiterman, the first communist minister to do so, to abandon his reserve.<sup>3</sup>

This decline in ideology to the benefit of force -- and the attraction of force -- is also found in the approach to problems of the Third World. Without a doubt, on the extreme periphery, as in the jungles of El Salvador, communist support still takes on the guise of the traditional anticapitalist, anti-imperialist revolution. But everywhere else, especially where it is a question of consolidating a friendly government, friendship is measured by the degree of support given to Soviet policy. The consolidation is obtained through military-police manipulations based on essentially "technical" concepts of power held in Moscow. The friend becomes a "dependent" which a Soviet, Cuban or East German guard will protect from the hostility of its opponents and this indefinitely, even when opponents are recruited from within the same "revolutionary" party as the friend to be defended.

That is why the debacles suffered in Egypt, Somalia and the Sudan can no longer be put forth as proof of the erratic, fragile nature of the Soviet engagement in the Third World. Without a doubt, withdrawals are still possible, but they will be much more difficult than before, insofar as the Soviets have perfected their methods of establishing themselves in the key seats of power, mainly the army and the police. There has even been talk of a "colonial lobby" set up over the years in Moscow, with the thousands of military, political and police advisers who have traveled in the countries of Asia and Africa and who have developed an experience unknown at the beginning of the movement 20 years ago.

These observations lead one to conclude that while the international communist movement has profoundly changed since the Comintern, it would be premature to bury it. Not only have the objectives assigned to it by the Soviet leaders not changed, but the new methods -- less ideological and more "technical" -- used to achieve them are not without effectiveness. It is most likely experimenting and will experience difficulty in maintaining its "internal front" --

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that is, in preserving its conquests, particularly in East Europe. The multilateral institutions destined to give it a more official existence also leave something to be desired. But the bilateral tie with Moscow remains as powerful as ever, at least for those parties and "friendly" forces that choose it. Nor are they lacking in reasons for doing so.

FOOTNOTES

1. Quoted by Lilly Marcou in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE of October 1980.
2. Despite the inclusion of Laos, a new recruit in Southeast Asia (one will note that "liberated" Cambodia still does not enjoy that honor), the list remains less impressive than that of the 1950's, when one saw China, Albania, Korea and, in certain cases, Yugoslavia. Today, these last countries are listed as "socialist countries that are not members of the Warsaw Pact or the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)" (PRAVDA, 24 February 1981).
3. Noting, in an interview with LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR (9 January 1982), that the new determination of the PCF "not to distinguish itself, on essential matters, from the USSR" coincides with a "strategy of withdrawal that is disastrous politically or in elections," the No 2 man in the PS continued: "We come to wonder whether the sole justification of such a policy would not, in the final analysis, be the idea that in one way or another, a series of shifts will finally give the USSR an increasingly dominant position in Europe and that Europe will finally topple."

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POLITICAL

SPAIN

BUSINESSMEN'S ASSOCIATION DEEMED POLITICALLY POWERFUL

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 11 May 82 pp 22, 23

[Article by J. Estefania Moreira: "The Accounts of the Great Captain"]

[Text] The latest opinion surveys conducted by businessmen point to a severe decline of the socialists compared to the initial figures and a major recovery of the UCD [Democratic Center Union and AP [Popular Alliance]. The businessmen's association feels that this change in the voting trend among Andalusians is due to its institutional campaign. This campaign involves an official economic budget of 117 million pesetas, several unofficial accounts of 400 million, and a technical apparatus of almost 500 men. These are the accounts of the great captain.

Seville--The latest field opinion surveys in the hands of the businessmen's association give us approximately the following percentages: PSOE [Spanish Socialist Workers Party] 43 percent; UCD, 18.5 percent; PSA [Socialist Party of Andalusia], 14 percent; AP, 10 percent; and PCA [Communist Party of Andalusia], 7 percent. These data are accompanied by an asterisk indicating that the great unknown may be the Andalusian Socialist Party but that the surprise always somehow boils down to a higher figure. The surveys, which were released early in March, gave the PSOE an absolute majority with 51 percent while the PSA got 10 percent, the UCD 8 percent, the AP 8 percent, and the PCA 6 percent. In terms of the trend, this signifies a major drop for the socialists, a very big rise for the UCD, a clear upswing for the PSA, and an increase for the AP and the PCA.

The interpretation of the statistics is being viewed in different ways by the businessmen's association (Confederation of Businessmen of Andalusia), on the one hand, and by the socialists, on the other hand. For the CEA [Confederation of Businessmen of Andalusia], the drop of the PSOE and the rise of the UCD and AP are to a great extent due to its institutional publicity campaign in the media as well as the events staged by the businessmen during which they explained the two readings of the Autonomy Charter. The PSOE, however, feels that the first statistics and perhaps the last ones also were deliberately inflated in order, first of all, to produce an effect of fear and, later on, to achieve that sensation of influence which the businessmen are trying to create.

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In any case, without discussing the level of influence, one thing that is certain is that the active presence of the businessmen's association during the Andalusian campaign did signify an obstacle to the socialists who had not expected so much resistance to their foreseeable victory in the campaigns of the AP and the UCD. To achieve that, the CEA began to plan its actions from the very first quarter of last year onward, according to its vice chairman Juan Salas Tornero, "When we became aware of the confusion springing from the postures of the PSOE which, on the other hand, made the historical mistake of the UCD in the Andalusian referendum perfectly profitable."

Yesterday, the CEA began the third phase of its institutional campaign after a meeting of its executive committee last Saturday during which the situation was reviewed and the best way to multiply the outside effects of the presence of Carlos Ferrer and Jose Maria Cuevas in Andalusia was discussed. Ferrer and Cuevas covered the eight provinces, attending various businessmen's events and holding a daily press conference, reaching their high point in their trip to Seville on Friday which, it is hoped, will be attended by twice the number of businessmen who attended the speech of Alfredo Molinas and Juan Salas Tornero last Thursday.

Increasing the Attendance

During this third phase of the campaign, according to a study which EL PAIS had learned about, the businessmen's activities will be continued, publicity in the media will be made more aggressive and "an in-house (four-page) periodical will be published; its name might very well be ANDALUCIA EMPRESA, which would be inserted into the region's most widely distributed newspaper. This periodical would contain editorials, interviews, reports, publicity, etc., which would deal with the development of the campaign. Plans call for the publication of special issues for the magazines GESTION EMPRESARIAL (Malaga), FEDERACION ONUBENSE DE EMPRESARIOS FOE (Huelva), ASOCIACION NACIONAL DEL PROFESORADO ESTATAL (regional), and NEUVA EMPRESA (Madrid). This action means using the information material which is being put together by the CEA as well as the specific production of other articles and interviews as a suitable vehicle for giving very specific sectors of Andalusian society the information and publicity which will promote the development of our campaign."

This in-house CEA study evaluates the presentation of the institutional campaign in the media, it explains the information coverage by the businessmen's association and its organization, as well as some of the techniques to be used by its men during the elections (by way of example, it is said that "on radio, with effective advice, we will not enter into any dialectical confrontation with representatives of the political parties").

The campaign's official cost was estimated at the time at 117 million, "which, when compared to what the political parties usually invest, is an extremely reasonable figure, as the cost of an operation intended to increase the knowledge of the Andalusian people on the features that their own future might assume. This figure is approximately correct as of this date," explained Salas Tornero. However, that is not the opinion of the rest of the forces competing in Andalusia. "The cost of the businessmen's campaign is far

greater than what they have admitted," said a socialist leader. "The businessmen have not invested that much money in a long time," he concluded. The first part of the statement is accepted almost unanimously. Some businessmen's sources admitted to EL PAIS that the real budget of the CEA will come to 400 million pesetas. And a good part of that money will come out of Madrid.

#### Madrid's Contribution

Specifically, in the planning for the institutional campaign among the leaders of the CEA and those of the CEOE [Confederation of Spanish Businessmen's Organizations], a figure of around 400 million pesetas was given, taking into account the experience of Labor Development during the elections to the Generalidad and the Galician Businessmen's Association in the recent elections for the autonomous parliament as well as the "forward jump" which the Andalusian campaign will reveal as compared the two past elections. About 150 million pesetas will be collected in Andalusia, according to the various methods adopted for each of the associations making up the CEA; there will be a fixed amount per worker, a very tiny percentage of the contribution from the tax on companies, voluntary contributions, etc. The rest, 250 million, is to be gotten from Madrid, first of all making the rounds among powerful organizations, with a second round among big enterprises, multinationals, and banks. The persons who are directly responsible for this additional financing operation were Ferrer and Cuevas, and the man in charge of collecting the money, a man from the CEOE apparatus, holding the post of assistant to the president, is called Miguel Angel Lopez Quesada.

After an initial moment of confusion, the budgeted amount is being collected in Andalusia; similarly, there are major difficulties in Madrid in getting financing for the Andalusian campaign which turns out to be very distant for the businessmen operating on a nationwide scale.

The campaign of the Andalusian businessmen is backed up by two parallel apparatuses which revolve around the same person: Jose Maria Cuevas, the CEOE secretary-general. Martin Almendros says that "At first we went to Madrid to ask for advice and to find out what the Galician and Catalan businessmen had done; however, after that the campaign became almost totally autonomous." The person who coordinated these initial contacts was Cuevas.

The apparatus which runs the campaign in the light of public observation is made up of the CEA leadership team, its president Martin Almendros; the two vice presidents, Juan Salas Tornero and Jose Bohorquez Mora Figueroa; and the president of the sixth territorial organizations and the six sector organizations. However, there is another apparatus which almost never shows up but which really runs the campaign by telephone. That outfit consists of the general secretary and the advisors of CEA, most of whom belonging to the old vertical union, trusted advisors to Jose Maria Cuevas, while some of them are real Martinvillistas. One can say the environment of the apparatchiks is the old union organization. There they learned almost all about their jobs and directors of economic affairs for the businessmen's council. That is true of Antonio Carrillo, CEA secretary general, or Santiago Herrero, political advisor to the businessmen's association and confidant of Ferrer Salat,



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and even Antonio Fernandez Palacios, secretary of the Confederation of Sevillian businessmen. These men are the ones who really coordinate the larger team of CEA collaborators in its campaign.

Among these collaborators, we must distinguish the following categories.

The coordinators. These are persons who promote and organize events, who go looking for the necessary documentation and the meeting places, etc. According to Jose Bohorquez, they number around 200 throughout Andalusia. In general, they are college graduates and professional men, such as lawyers, economists, and secretaries. The money they will get for participating in the two months of the campaign varies between 300,000 pesetas for those who command the highest price on the market and 100,000 pesetas for those who are going to be secretaries.

The instructors. These are businessmen who attend events during which the meaning of the campaign is explained. Around 150 of them get nothing for their work, "not even gasoline for their travels." This is a category of militant businessmen who want to make sure that the PSOE will be slowed down to prevent bigger trouble in the future.

The network of fund-raisers in each sector of territorial organization. These are the men responsible for preventing a deficit in the campaign. They are leading businessmen. Juan Salas thinks that "there have been many businessmen who contributed 5,000 pesetas. Many more than those who gave large amounts. The reason is the greater awareness which has developed among small businessmen during 3 years of city management by the left-wing forces and the rise in city taxes, an experience which however neither the Galicians, nor the Catalans have had."

To all of these groups we must add the press offices which have their headquarters in Seville; the usual apparatuses of the confederations, not specifically created for the campaign but supporting it, and the two coordinators of western and eastern Andalusia. "One cannot say that all of these are campaign expenditures," explained Antonio Carrillo, CEA secretary general. "The most important thing is what is left after it; an entire infrastructure which will help provide a strong impetus for the Confederation and which, once established, will work always."

Image Encountered

In addition to the costs connected with publicity, infrastructure, and pay for persons released from work, the businessmen's association will have to contribute a large sum of money--which EL PAIS has not managed to estimate--to the public relations consulting agency which has conducted a public opinion survey and which has generated the entire businessmen's campaign image. This is the Task agency, Technical Consultants Associated, whose general manager, Gabriel Castro Villalba (a friend of Cuevas, Fabian Marquez, and other persons in the CEOE apparatus) has already taken on the same job for the Galician businessmen with such good results. Task is an enterprise that sprang from the old Areurop

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of SEU [Spanish University Union] leader Aparicio Bernal, specializing above all in energy topics. Some of its competitors explained to this periodical that a good portion of the persons running Task comes also from the old vertical union and from Spanish Television and National Radio during the early 1970's.

Neither CEA as such, nor CEOE will however pay any amount of money directly to the specific political parties. "We do not give moral or economic support to any party," declared Jose Bohorquez emphatically; he denies that CEA had withdrawn financing from the Andalusian Unity the party of Clavero Arevalo, because it believed that the party would not have any importance in elections unless it fell in with Fraga Iribarne. "We did not withdraw any financing from them, nor did we give them any," said Bohorquez. "That is not our job; besides, the parties must depend on membership dues and on the solvency of their militants, not on outside institutions."

In the opinion a very representative member of the CEOE top leadership, we must draw a distinction between direct financing given by CEOE to the political parties, which does not exist ("the budgets of the CEOE are known and are not taken out of thin air; they provide for nothing more than the daily activities of the top businessmen association's leadership"), on the one hand, and the attitude of the CEOE, on the other hand, when it acts as a broker, that is to say, as a middleman between the conventional financing outfits and the political parties.

This representative middleman role is what some political formations will be seeking with the utmost care during the coming general elections, realizing the influence which the CEOE has gained in the Spanish economic world. In second place, there is the hope that the businessmen's association would in the most explicit fashion possible clarify its voting preference since minimum election discipline on the part of the organized businessmen (more than a million, according to the CEOE), sweeping the family vote with them, would accumulate energy behind the elected party which would be very difficult to overcome. This hope has been denied time and again by all businessmen's leaders: "We will never divide the vote of the sociological right because that would mean dividing ourselves." It will thus be difficult to find out how Martin Almendros, Jose Bohorquez, Juan Salas or Juan Jimenez Aguilar will vote. None of them wanted to answer that question for this paper, not even on a personal basis.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

8TH FIGHTER WING TRAINING PILOTS ON ALPHA JET

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 30 Apr 82 pp 28-29

[Article: "In the 8th Fighter Wing, the Alpha Jet Is Succeeding the Mystere IV"]

[Text] The "experiment" which AIR ET COSMOS announced, in its issue No 861 of 23 May 1981 (p 39), that it would be interesting to follow really began at Cazaux on 19 April 1982: on that day there began within the 8th Fighter Wing, previously equipped solely with Mystere IV's, the first-stage "flight instruction" phase on Alpha Jets for the 12 cadet pilots constituting ETO (Operational Transformation Wing) class 82/C, who a few days earlier had graduated from the Fighter School of Tours, where all their instruction as future combat pilots had also been done on Alpha Jets. On 9 July, these 12 pilots will report to their first assigned operational unit; they will be the first in the Air Force to have been trained, in a progressive and continuous manner, on Alpha Jets, after an introductory phase on CAP-10's and then on Fougas: at Tours first of all, in the Fighter School; then at Cazaux, within the 8th EC [Fighter Wing], which constitutes the last link in the chain of schools before the young fighter pilots go off to units that come directly under the Tactical Air Force of Air Defense.

It will be interesting to learn, in a few months, the first judgments that the unit commanders will make about their new "recruits" trained almost entirely on Alpha Jets--that is, about the interest and advantages of the approach based on the same high-performance airplane for preparing the cadets in the two-seater planes that train them for their future weapons-carrying planes: the Mirage III, Jaguar, Mirage F-1, Mirage 2000.

But the preparations for the experiment began, as planned, last year--first of all with the "transformation" of the mechanics, then with transformation of the first pilot-instructors of the "Saintonge" 1st Squadron of the 8th Wing. At the end of last year, some 50 mechanics at Cazaux had been transformed to the Alpha Jet; and others will be until next November. The technological instruction is given at the ETIS (Specialized Technical Instruction Group) of Tours. In December 1981, the 1st Squadron of the 8th EC had five Alpha Jets; the other 10--the rest of its fleet--arrived at Cazaux between January and April of this year.

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The transformation of the 1/8 squadron was carried out between December 1981 and March 1982. Last December, two pilots of the 8th EC went to Tours to transform the monitor system practiced by the Fighter School. With the transformed pilots already assigned, including the wing commander and the chief of operations, they constituted the nucleus responsible for the transformation of the pilots of the two squadrons. The transformation of the Nice squadron 2/8 will be done from next September to November, at the same time that the 15 Alpha Jets assigned to it are delivered. Before their flight instruction at Cazaux, all the pilots to be transformed are also taking the airplane-technology course at the ETIS of Tours. The pilot-transformation program comprises 20 missions. It is designed to give the pilot-instructor the best knowledge of use of the Alpha Jet, both in the area of flight and as regards the principal exercises that will be done in flight with the trainees--in particular, air-to-air and air-to-ground firing, both simulated and real.

Next November, the 8th Fighter Wing will be entirely transformed to Alpha Jets; the last Mystere IV's that it has, and on which another four classes will be trained in 1982, will then be withdrawn from service.

Last January, a fixed-cabin simulator mounted on a trailer was set up at Cazaux. It differs from those set up at Tours in the following respects: no movement of the cabin; presence of a graphic screen on the monitor's panel; possibility of adding a system for synthetic visualization in night or dusk flight.

Except for the external pylons, the armaments--cannon pods, internal pylons, LFR4 rocket launchers--have been set up at Cazaux for instruction of the cadres and the young pilots of the 1st Squadron of the 8th EC. The 8th Wing will have all of its armament by March 1983, on condition that the present schedule is kept to.

#### Four Main Principles

"We have departed," stresses General Gimbert, "from the fundamental idea that the Tours-Cazaux program forms a whole and that the instruction has to be made to produce maximum output, taking into account for Cazaux everything that has been done at Tours. The program of Training Group 314, which is well-adapted to the level of qualification required for the fighter-pilot certification, does not make it possible to take maximum advantage of the operational possibilities of the Alpha Jet as regards air-to-air and air-to-ground firing. This will be done at Cazaux. Use of the same type of plane by the Fighter School and by the 8th Wing will definitely facilitate the effectiveness of the instruction, making it regular and homogeneous in the school and in the wing.

"For the instruction of the future fighter pilots within the Operational Transformation Wing," General Gimbert continues, "four main principles have been adopted.

"We have not wanted to either increase or decrease the average duration of instruction, which will remain some 50 hours per pilot. There is indeed no reas-

on for an increase, since the Alpha Jet is a very demonstrative and pedagogical weapons plane. Decrease? This could doubtlessly have been done, but we have in the last analysis preferred to distribute over all of the disciplines taught the flying hours which until now have been devoted to familiarization with the Mystere IV. At Tours, 25 percent of flights were done solo; at Cazaux, the percentage of solo flights will reach 34 percent, so as to free the trainee from the presence of the monitor in the rear seat and get him used to getting along by himself. The qualification level at the end of the training course should thereby be improved.

"We have also wanted to get the maximum advantage from the two-seater configuration of the Alpha Jet, particularly in maneuvering and in firing exercise; everything that the trainee will have to do solo will have been systematically demonstrated to him beforehand in the dual-control mode.

"The third principle is that the recording cameras will be used systematically for restitution of firing, simulated or real.

"Finally, the rear-seat flying hours done, as the case may be, by a pilot in training in the ETO will not be counted as instruction.

"The main objectives sought," General Gimbert concludes, "are of two kinds. On the technical level, the trainee will have to be instructed in the work of the crewman, within the framework of the operational missions and the use of the Alpha Jet's weapons system; for any maneuver, the trainee will have to be able to hold up his end as an indissociable crew-member. He will also have to be given very solid basic training in air-to-ground firing (cannon, rockets, bombs) and air-to-air firing (cannon). Finally, the instructors will place emphasis on the sky-surveillance missions"

On the level of personality, there is a double objective: at the same time as responsibility and initiative are developed, the motivation, aggressiveness and endurance of the future combat pilots will have to be verified.

"The pilots arriving from Tours will spend about 4 months in the ETO. The training course which is presently planned, but the program of which has not yet been ratified definitively--and this will doubtlessly not happen before mid-1983, so as to take into account the experience acquired with the first classes--will last 14 weeks, broken down as follows: 1 week at Mont-de-Marsan, for study of survival problems; 1 week of ground school at Cazaux; 1 week of training on the ground and flight instruction (introduction to night flying, partly on Fougas); and 11 weeks of flight instruction on Alpha Jets.

"During the ground sessions, the simulator will be used to keep up the trainee's knowledge of normal and emergency procedures as well as his reflex actions in case of emergency, so as to maintain and verify the VSV [expansion unknown] qualification and the trainee's skill in radionavigation. It will also be used to enable the trainee to have perfect knowledge of the procedures in force on Cazaux's diversion fields. Finally, it will also be used for English-language instruction.

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"In any case, the Cazaux program will be validated only after knowledge and exploitation of the observations and remarks formulated by the commanding officers of operational units. Any modification of the Cazaux program will logically have immediate repercussions at Tours, since, once again, the program of instruction forms a whole. At the present time, therefore, the Tours program cannot be considered 'fixed'."

We note in this regard that this remark addresses concern that the commanding officers of the Air Force schools have always had: to dispense training that should evolve constantly.

By the end of this year, the 8th Wing should have had 4,300 hours of flying activity on Alpha Jets. The total should rise to some 12,000 hours for 1983 alone (two squadrons--30 planes--entirely activated).

Renovated Infrastructure

The arrival at Cazaux of the Alpha Jets replacing the Mystere IV's has not had the effect of fundamentally upsetting the infrastructure of air base 120. Nevertheless, certain operations of adaptation and, on the same occasion, renovation of old installations have been carried out.

In particular, it has been necessary to install a test bench for the Larzac turbojet as well as a liquid-oxygen distribution station (in the case of the Mystere IV, gaseous oxygen is required). We mention again the recent setting-up of the trailer housing the fixed-cabin simulator.

The "engine" shops of the base have been refitted to handle the modularity characteristic of the Larzac. The 8th EC, of course, already has an Alpha Jet GERMAS [expansion unknown], presently autonomous, for all the materiel whose reliability has been proven. The necessary provisions have been made for the Alpha Jets in service in the ETO not to have to be overhauled before 1983.

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MILITARY

FRANCE

EPSILON, XINGU TRAINING PLANES TO GRADUALLY GO INTO USE

Epsilon Prototype Tested

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 30 Apr 82 p 43

[Article by J.G.: "'The Epsilon: a Very Good Demonstrator Fighter,' the Commanding Officer of the Schools Considers"]

[Text] Air Force General Henri Gimbert, commanding officer of the Air Force Schools, flew for the first time, on 13 April 1982, in the 02 prototype of the Epsilon, the future single-engine training plane (with an economical 300-HP Lycoming) of the Air Force, which has made a first order for 30 of these planes within the framework of a total fleet of about 150.

This informational flight, lasting about an hour, took place at Istres, where the plane was under the responsibility of the Flight-Testing Center. At the conclusion of the interview on the Alpha Jet that General Gimbert had kindly granted us (see pages 23 to 29 of this issue), we asked him his impressions of this new product of Aerospatiale's "Airplanes" division, built by the SOCATA [expansion unknown] at Tarbes and designed to meet the Air Force's training needs.

Here, in a very direct style, is a summary of his comments: "The informational flight that I made in the Epsilon with a pilot of the CEV [Flight-Testing Center] was concentrated essentially on the plane's stall behavior. I therefore did a series of stalls (a good 10 of them) in all possible configurations. I did two deliberate tailspins. I did a bit of acrobatics. I did a normal GCA [Ground-Controlled Approach System] approach, then an "all-reduced" approach. All this in about 60 minutes. This first flight obviously falls within the framework of the pilot-progression study that the Air Force Schools Command is presently carrying out, with the information at its disposal.

"From this first flight I have the impression that the Epsilon has been designed very well. Fast and very easy to handle, it is a small fighter that is a good demonstrator. The cadet trained on the Epsilon will easily and rapidly fathom the mysteries of side-slipping and skipping.

"Actually, the Epsilon's real capacities are not yet known, and in this regard I quite obviously expect a great deal from the experimentation with the plane

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being conducted by the CEAM [Military Air-Experimentation Center] of Mont-de-Marsan."

In the present state of knowledge of the Schools Command, the Epsilon is in a very good position for taking over completely from the Fouga Magisters in the first part of the training given at Cognac by Training Group 315, which is responsible for the training of the pilots who are ultimately to serve in the operational units (fighter and transport) of the Air Force, the Navy Air Force and certain foreign countries.

Currently, for the pilot cadets who do not go through the Air School or the Military Air School (being trained at Salon-de-Provence), the progression is as follows: 17 hours of preselection at Aulnat on the CAP-10; 80 hours of basic pilot training at Cognac (20 hours in CAP-10's, then 60 hours in Fougas, in a common training section); then, for those who are not oriented toward fighter planes, 135 hours at Avord for the future Transall pilots or 150 hours at Châmbéry for the future helicopter pilots.

For those who can go through the fighter-pilot sequence, there has recently been added an additional segment of 65 flying hours at Cognac in Fougas, before going on to the Fighter School of Tours (85 hours in the Alpha Jet) and then the 8th Fighter Wing (some 50 hours in the Alpha Jet is planned).

At Cognac, where the first assembly-line Epsilons will be delivered in Fall 1983, this new single-engine two-seater could very well be used for the "common section" phase: something on the order of 70 hours of flying time, until the point of no return is reached for the pilots not going into the fighter-pilot sequence. Thus, only the future fighter pilots would henceforth fly Fougas at Cognac. These 70 hours would break down as follows: 24 hours of piloting, including aerobatics; 12 hours of formation flying; 18 hours of flying without visibility; 8 hours of low-altitude flying; 8 hours of night flying. Again, as of right now these are only estimations, since the program envisioned for this machine whose aerodynamic qualities General Gimbert has praised can still evolve.

**Xingu at Avord in 1983**

Paris AIR ET COSMOS in French 30 Apr 82 p 43

[Article: "The First Xingu at Avord in May 1983"]

[Text] In principle, the first of the 25 Xingu twin turbojets ordered by the French government from Embraer are to arrive at the Avord base, for Training Group 319, Air Force Propeller-Driven Airplane Specialization School, in March 1983. These planes are gradually to replace the MD-312 twin-engine planes previously used for the initial training of the future transport pilots of the COTAM (Military Air Transport Command) before they go on to the CIET (Transport-Plane Crew-Training Center) at Toulouse.

How, then, will the progression be handled for the first trainees arriving from Salon-de-Provence or from Cognac, where they will first have been trained on

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CAP-10's and Fougas (while the arrival of the first Epsilons at Cognac is awaited)? This question is currently the subject of studies being conducted jointly by the CEAA [expansion unknown] and by the COTAM. In principle, General Gimbert considers, the duration of the training with the Xingu at GE [Training Group] 319 should not be modified much in relation to what it presently is in the MD-312: 8 months, or about 130 hours of flying time. What could change is the respective distribution of activity and disciplines as between the Avord school and the Toulouse center. In particular, it is possible that the aspects relative to general air traffic (CAG), heretofore dealt with at Toulouse because the performance characteristics of the MD-312 did not permit it, will be entirely or partly taken in charge by the instructors of GE 319.

What is certain as of now is that at Avord, very intensive use will be made of the LMT-350 two-seater flight trainers, two of which have already been delivered. The low-altitude tactical-flying instruction and the group-flying training will quite naturally be done at the CIET.

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END